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CASENOTES
TORTS:

Now? NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOOHIo-Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4
Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
WHERE TO
TIONAL DISTRESS IN

INTRODUCTION

Although Ohio has long been laggard in the recognition of recovery for emotional distress,1 it recently bolted into accord with current
notions of tort recovery with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in
Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co.2 In Schultz, a near unanimous courts
obliterated Ohio's seventy-five-year-old impact rule for emotional distress recovery.' By implication, the court followed the lead of other jurisdictions 5 which have abandoned not only the impact rule, but also
the requirement of physical manifestation of fright-a requirement
designed to protect against simulated personal injury claims.6
While Ohio tort law has needed direction, an abrupt shift to the
extreme left7 may leave the Ohio courts off balance and result in some
emotional distress claims receiving undue judicial recognition. Although Schultz may seem to offer generous guidelines for the injured
plaintiff,8 other jurisdictions which have expanded the bounds of emo1. For an example of Ohio's cold objectivity, see Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3
N.E.2d 694 (1936) (plaintiff was denied recovery for emotional distress absent an impact, even
when plaintiff viewed her dead sister's mangled body abandoned by the murderer).
2. 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
3. The decision was six to one. The sole dissenter was Justice Holmes.
4. The impact rule originated in Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio S.W.R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309,
85 N.E. 499 (1908). See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
5. The court particularly considered Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509
(1970) and Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). Both cases relied upon the
ability of the jury to spot dishonest claims and held that the judicial system itself provides safeguards against contrived claims.
6. For a thorough judicial evaluation of such a position, see Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp.,
27 Cal. 3d 925, 927-31, 616 P.2d 813, 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-39 (1980); Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970).
7. The propriety of such boldness will subsequently be evaluated as the benefits gained from
avoiding the inherent pitfalls of the zone of danger rule are balanced against the judicial results of
a haphazard adoption of the genuineness of proof standard. For a discussion of the zone of danger
rule, see infra text accompanying notes 48-52. The genuineness of proof concept originated in
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 32, 38 (1961).
8. The Ohio Supreme Court fails to address the defendant's right to freedom of action and
society's right to advancement. The court does not espouse the position that "the right to absolute
peace and quiet must be foregone so that the business of life may be carried on." Note, Right to
Recover for Injuries Resulting from Negligence without Impact, 50 AM. L. REG. 141, 142
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tional distress law have tended to refine the parameters of recovery.9
Part I of this note will present the facts of the case. Part II will
discuss the common-law approach to emotional distress.claims. Part III
will examine Schultz's impact on the components of an emotional dis-

tress cause of action and the ramifications for subsequent emotional
distress claims.
I.

FACTS

&

HOLDING

As Elliott Schultz followed a truck owned and operated by the
Barberton Glass Company,10 a sheet of glass1 1 fell from the truck, hit
the highway, and rebounded directly into Mr. Schultz's windshield. Although glass struck his face as he drove, Schultz managed to retain
control of his vehicle and bring it to a stop on the shoulder of the highway.12 Schultz promptly sought medical attention, 13 - but hospital per14
sonnel did not discover any physical injury.
Schultz and his wife Barbara filed suit against Barberton Glass
Company and its employee-driver in the Court of Common Pleas of
Summit County,1 8 alleging that the defendants negligently allowed the
sheet of glass to fall from the truck.1 Schultz claimed permanent injuries necessitating continued medical and psychiatric treatment 7 and set
his demand at $200,000.18
The jury awarded Schultz $50,000.19 Pursuant to defendants'

(1902).
9. Hawaii is such a jurisdiction. In Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (plaintiffs suffered distress from the flooding of their house) and Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520
P.2d 758 (1974) (bystander case), the Hawaii Supreme Court allowed the jury to conclude that
emotional distress results from the nature of the negligence. In Kelly v. Kokua Sales & Supply
Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975), the court denied the plaintiff recovery for a heart
attack caused by a telephone call in which the plaintiff learned about the deaths of his daughter
and grandchildren. The court concluded that Mr. Kelly was located an unreasonable distance
from the scene of the accident so as to preclude recovery. This limitation seems to result in a
hybrid of the zone of danger rule discussed infra notes 48-52. Ensuing physical injury also remained relevant in Hawaii: see infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.
10. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 132, 447 N.E.2d at 110.
11. The sheet was eight feet square and one-quarter inch thick. Id.
12. Id.
13. Schultz received treatment at the emergency room of Akron General Medical Center.
Id.
14. Schultz's family physician examined him the next day and found no evidence of eye
trauma. Id.
15. Id. The Schultz's filed the action on February 1, 1980.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Barbara Schultz apparently alleged that the accident resulted in loss of consortium. See
infra note 19.
19. The jury also awarded Schultz's wife $10,000 for loss of consortium. The award was not
contested on appeal. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/7

CASENOTES

1983]

timely appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District reversed and
remanded the case to the trial court with an order to determine
whether Schultz incurred contemporaneous physical injury as required
in Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co.20 Upon a
motion to certify the record, the Ohio Supreme Court faced the formidable question of whether contemporaneous physical injury would continue to be a condition precedent to recovery for the negligent infliction
of serious emotional distress.2
The court, led by Chief Justice Celebrezze, could have followed

precedent and disallowed Schultz's recovery entirely.22 Contrarily, the
court could have overruled precedent and either followed the physical
manifestation of fright requirement 23 or expressly deferred to established parameters of recovery relied upon in other jurisdictions.2 4 Instead, the court held that a contemporaneous physical injury is not
mandatory to maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court, however, only tacitly adopted the standards
of proof developed in more progressive jurisdictions" while overlooking
such issues as Barberton's duty of care,
proximate cause, and an expla6
nation of serious emotional distress.
The majority opinion focused upon a discussion of impact rule justifications and proof of damages.2 7 The court noted that the predicted
torrent of litigation resulting from the abolition of the impact rule had
not materialized. 8 It reasoned that the flood of litigation would have

20. 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
21. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 132, 447 N.E.2d at 110.
22. See Koontz, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E. 694; see also Wolfe v. A. & P. Tea Co., 143
Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944) (plaintiff allowed to recover for shock resulting from eating
from a can contaminated with worms, if physical injury was proven); Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113
Ohio App. 449, 172 N.E.2d 734 (1961) (plaintiff denied recovery for death of spouse and mother
who died from fright while trying to escape from a fire).
23. A similar result was urged by the dissent, relying on Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass.

540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). The

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 436 A (1965), also ad-

vances the position that, "if the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of
causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional
disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for
such emotional disturbance."
24. See Molien, 27. Cal. 3d 925, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980); Rodrigues, 52
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Leong, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); see also Rickey v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981) (bystander case).
25. "We agree with these courts. Judges and juries will consider the credibility of witnesses
and the genuineness of the proof as they do in other cases. In most instances, expert medical
testimony will help establish the validity of the claim ....
" 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 447 N.E.2d at
112 (1983) (citing Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 525; Niederman, 436 Pa. at 407,
261 A.2d at 90).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 65-81, 88-99 & 99-110.
27. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 134, 447 N.E.2d at 111-12.
28. byId.
Published
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already passed its peak, considering the Ohio cases predicating recovery upon any slight injury.2 Finally, the court concluded that the
plaintiff's right to recovery predominated over judicial convenience.30
Reasoning that the hazard of illusory claims for emotional distress
is no greater than that for minor physical injury claims, the majority
summarily dismissed the assertion that an impact requirement moderates fraudulent claims.3 1 Further, the court held that the same evidentiary system which protects the integrity of tort litigation would likewise protect the integrity of emotional distress claims."2
A discussion of feigned claims revolves around the issue of proof of
damages-the final bastion of the impact rule proponents. The Ohio
court, among other jurisdictions," expressed faith in the ability of the
judge and jury to spot both dishonesty and self-deception in litigants."
As a result of Schultz, the court apparently intends to place primary
reliance upon the jury's perception of subjective elements of proof,
since expert medical testimony, 5 in the majority's words, will "[iun
most instances . . . help establish the validity of the claim of serious

emotional distress."36 The opinion implies that the standard of proof
will vary from case to case. The jury must hear the testimony and eval37
uate it against standards of propriety.
Justice Holmes, the sole dissenter,3 8 objected to the paucity of
guidelines in the majority opinion purporting to preclude unlimited liability. 9 The dissent advocated the continued use of objective symptomatology of fright, 0 traditionally a filter to feigned claims. Justice
Holmes cited Payton v. Abbott Labs," which held that evidence of
plaintiff's physical injury from fright must be offered to maintain an
action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.'2

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 134, 447 N.E.2d at 112.
32. Id.
33. See infra note 111.
34. "The judicial system and evidentiary requirements have proven to be safeguards against
ficticious claims in other personal injury cases and will function similarly in emotional distress
cases." 4 Ohio St. 3d at 134, 447 N.E.2d at 112.
35. Medical testimony is in fact the sole objective measure advocated by the majority.
36. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
37. Both judges and juries are to consider the credibility of witnesses and genuineness of
proof.
38. Justice Holmes was the sole dissenter in both Schultz and Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.
3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).
39. Justice Holmes stated that the majority's framework presented an "ever widening legal
horizon" on which to found claims. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 139, 447 N.E.2d at 115.
40. Id.
41. 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171.(1982).
42. Justice Holmes recommended objective symptomatology because other jurisdictions
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/7

CASENOTES

1983]

II.

COMMON-LAW EVOLUTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

An examination of the historical perception of mental disturbance
reveals an area shrouded with prejudice, fear, and misconception. Society's ignorance has tainted the treatment of the mentally infirm4 and
has inhibited the realization that emotional distress constitutes a legitimate evil worthy of judicial protection."' Unlike other torts, emotional
distress has inherited a stigma from its traditionally disdained cousin,
mental disturbance. The stumbling block to emotional distress recovery
continues to center upon proof of injury; emotional distress can be easily fabricated while psychosis or serious physical injury cannot be denied."G The overemphasis on possible feigned claims resulted in artificial limitations on recovery as the historical norm.
Originally, compensation for emotional distress hinged upon its relationship to a separate, actionable injury. 6 Thus, emotional distress
was parasitic to the parent action. The impact rule, by mandating
physical contact with the plaintiff as a condition precedent to recovery
mental distress, falls within a parasitic scheme of
for the accompanying
damages. '47
Courts gradually shifted the arbitrary distinction between recovery
and demurrer from a physical impact requirement to a presence in the
ordinary range of physical peril requirement.' The zone of danger rule,
as it is more commonly known, represents a clever distortion of the

have already set the course and because fright not resulting in an external condition offers no
guarantee of genuineness. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 139-40, 447 N.E.2d at 116 (1983).
43. L. BELL, TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1980). Also, in August of 1943, General
George E. Patton became incensed at two soldiers hospitalized for traumatic neurosis; as reported
by General Eisenhower, General Patton cuffed one soldier until his helmet rolled onto the floor.
Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 87, 114 (1943) (quoting Dallas
Morning News, Nov. 27, 1943, at 7, col. 1).
44. Mental distress connotes either insanity or evanescent subjective moods. Lord Wensleydale remarked, "[m]ental pain or anxiety the law . . . does not pretend to redress, when the
unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861).
45. All common-law schemes attempt to ensure the genuineness of claims by establishing
conditions for recovery which the plaintiff would presumably be unwilling to endure in order to
fabricate a claim; examples include physical impact, presence in the zone of danger, the Dillon
guidelines, and the ensuing physical injury requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 54,
111-120.
46. Such is the typical origin of any legally protected interest. For an excellent discussion of
the law's developmental recognition of any interest, see Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 339, 340-46 (1963).
47. Note, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Changing the Impact
Rule in Indiana, 54 IND. L.J. 467 (1979). Ohio traditionally demanded not only physical impact,
but physical injury from the impact, as a prerequisite to recovery. Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 136
Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939) (where plaintiff was denied recovery for emotional distress
when trapped between padded coach doors because the battery did not result in physical injury),
overruled, Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
48. Note, supra note 47, at 471.
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impact rule, as presence in the zone of physical peril means that the
plaintiff fears physical impact.4
The California case of Dillon v. Legg50 focused sharp attention on
the fundamental absurdity of the zone of danger rule. In that case, a
mother was unable to recover for shock sustained by seeing her minor
child struck by a negligent motorist, while, ironically, the victim's sister-who stood between the victim and the mother--could recover
under the rule.51 The court discarded the zone of danger rule in outrage and resolved to evaluate each case under the standard rules of tort
law, "including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability.'5 2 Thus, the crux of evaluating the defendant's range of
duty became the reasonable foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff.53
Notwithstanding its sympathy for the Dillon mother, the California court recognized the need for standards in evaluating when emotional distress recovery would be appropriate. The Dillon court held
relevant, in conferring liability,
(1) the plaintiff's strategic location at the accident site,
(2) whether the shock resulted from plaintiff's sensory perception of
the event or from information obtained after the fact, and
(3) plaintiff's relationship to the victim."
In spite of the court's effort to devise a framework under which
recovery for emotional distress hinges upon equity and not mechanical
"cookbook" requirements, subsequent courts have converted the guidelines into prerequisites so that reasonably foreseeable fright goes uncompensated. 5 Such convolutions revive the arbitrary rules that Dillon
allegedly disposed of.
49. Logically, plaintiffs who receive a slight impact are no more deserving than plaintiffs
who are merely in the zone of danger. Expanding the scope of defendant's liability via the zone of
danger rule merely manipulates the artificial barrier to recovery.
50. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
51. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85. Dillon overruled the five-year-old case
of Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963), which involved facts similar to those in Dillon. Amaya relied on earlier decisions which
held that even where a child, sister, or spouse is the object of plaintiff's apprehension, no cause of
action is stated unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, fright, or
shock as a result of fear for his or her own safety. Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 45, 319
P.2d 80, 82 (1957).
52. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
53. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
54. Id.
55. Unless the facts of the claim are custom fitted to the Dillon guidelines, recovery is
unlikely. Subsequent California decisions are surveyed in Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App.
3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/7
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III.

ANALYSIS

Recovery for emotional distress finally reached maturity upon the
advent of the Schultz decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio decided
that a plaintiff's claim for emotional distress predominates over a defendant's liability for the unintentional infliction of emotional distress
by providing the plaintiff with the benefit of every judicial doubt."
While in virtual agreement that the impact rule needed revision, the
majority and dissenting justices deadlocked on the proper parameters
for recovery.57 The majority's decision complacently leaves the question
of liability to the jury, naively ignoring the tendency to measure foreseeability by hindsight," while the dissent summarily solves the issue
by relying upon evidence of objective symptomatology resulting from
the fright.59 The majority concerns itself with ideals of fairness and
humanitarianism, while the dissent embraces a pragmatic, applicationoriented approach.
The Schultz decision resulted from a fact pattern wherein the
events could possibly be classified within the categories that carry a
presumption of emotional distress.60 Ohio courts will eventually face
56. The tone of the majority opinion is extremely plaintiff-oriented, in that the court provides no parameters for a defendant's scope of duty, pays only minimal attention to proximate
cause, and abandons the physical manifestation of fright requirement. See text accompanying
notes 65-86, 88-99, & 99-110.
57. The majority relied on the genuineness of proof standard without recommending an
analysis to determine if the proof is genuine. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112. See Note,
Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical Injury, 10 CAP. U.L.
REV. 851, 865 n.80 (1981). The dissent relied upon Payton, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171
(1982), where DES daughters were not allowed to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress resulting from the increased statistical chance that the plaintiffs would suffer serious illness in the future.
58. Although foreseeability seems obvious when viewing the wreckage, many actors do not
appreciate the risks of their conduct. The law should encourage evaluation of a behavior's likely
results and the prevention of those risks should remain with the bench. See Blackmer, infra note
71, at 1162.
59. The dissent focused almost exclusively upon proof of damages, omitting judicial controls
such as duty and proximate cause.
60. One such category is the negligent transmission of a death message. See SaRelle v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881); Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752,
62 N.W. 1 (1895); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632, 36 So. 517 (1903).
The second group of cases involves the negligent mishandling of corpses. See Renihan v.
Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (1890) (misdelivery); Torres v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1962) (autopsy and unauthorized burial); Lott v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 296, 225
N.Y.S.2d 434 (1962) (confusion of bodies); Weingast v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 824, 254 N.Y.S.2d
952 (1964) (confusion of bodies). For extensive list of cases, see W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 54
(4th ed. 1971). See also Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980) (negligent diagnosis of syphillis in spouse created presumption of emotional
distress).
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cases in which recovery is not so clearly appropriate, and this category
of cases will suffer from the lack of evaluative criterion in Schultz. 1
The only express parameters for recovery for mental distress provided by the Schultz holding are that the shock be "serious" and that
the evidence pass muster under the jury's scrutiny of credibility of witnesses and the genuineness of proof.62 The majority deals with the issues of duty of care and foreseeability only to the extent that it defers
to other jurisdictions. This section will examine the impact of the Schultz decision on the elements of an ordinary negligence actions and the
likely trend for subsequent emotional distress claims.
A.

Establishing Both a Duty & a Breach

Schultz is the culmination of the Ohio courts' struggle with the
classic emotional distress issue: when, and under what circumstances
the value of the plaintiff's emotional tranquility exceeds the defendant's
burden of potentially unlimited liability." More specifically, when does
a defendant have a legal duty to refrain from negligent conduct which
could result in a plaintiff suffering emotional distress?
A legal duty can best be defined as "the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff
is entitled to protection."6 Policy considerations have traditionally included an evaluation of which party can most efficiently bear the loss, 6
the utility of the proscribed conduct, the seriousness of the plaintiff's
harm, the possibility of contrived claims, the administrative workability
of the decision, the foreseeability of the harm, 7 and the deterrence of

61. Indeed, a clerk who inadvertently misschedules a wedding, or a bank teller who mistakenly transmits an insufficient funds notice, might well wonder as to their liability under Schultz.
62. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 132, 447 N.E.2d at 110. For a discussion of seriousness requirements,
see infra text accompanying notes 103-110. Subsequently in Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 80, 451
N.E.2d at 767, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that jurors may defer to their own experience
in determining if the defendant's conduct resulted in serious emotional distress. Such a scheme is
unwise in that it introduces material beyond the control of the court, and therefore, proof of injury
becomes subjective. See Blackmer, infra note 71, at 1166-67.
63. The elements of a negligence action are, of course, a duty to adhere to a standard of
care to avoid subjecting others to an unreasonable risk, a breach of that duty, a causal connection
between the substandard behavior and plaintiff's injuries, and proof of actual injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
64. The concept of unlimited liability was first addressed in the case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 631 (Ex. 1842), which denied recovery in a product liability case for lack
of privity. See Note, infra note 110, at 547-48 for an analogy to fright cases.
65. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
66. Chief Justice Learned Hand advanced his famous formula for economic analysis in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
67. Foreseeability should be but one factor in the duty analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/7
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tortious conduct. 8
All too often, American courts have followed the trend of English
courts by restricting the essence of duty to a question of foreseeability." 9 This limitation results in the judge relinquishing control of the
related policy decisions, since foreseeability is a question of fact for the
jury which must be abandoned to its discretion.7 0 If the judge determines as a matter of law that a reasonable juror might find that the
emotional distress was a foreseeable result of the defendant's deficient
71
conduct, the issue must go to the jury for an ad hoc determination.
The Schultz court's intention regarding a defendant's legal duty
2
must be ascertained by inference from the case's facts and decision.
The harrowing fact pattern specific to this case leaves in doubt the
precedential value of the decision. Had the court faced a situation
wherein the emotional tug was less towards the plaintiff, the decision
would have represented a resolution of a social dilemma instead of lip
service to liberalizing tort standards.3
The Ohio Supreme Court made several policy decisions in its opinion. First, the court recognized emotional tranquility as a legally protected interest.7 4 Although the court states that emotional injury is on a
par with physical injury, its requirement that an emotional injury be
serious-while any minor physical injury can be compensated-indicates that emotional injuries will continue to be measured
against a longer yardstick. 5
Second, the court found that the possibility of fabricated claims

68. For an evaluation of methods to achieve deterrence for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Miller, The Scope of Liabilityfor Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1, 23 (1979). For a general discussion of the policies involved in an adequate duty analysis, see Note, supra note 47, at 474-79.
69. English cases using foreseeability as a test of duty include Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1
K.B. 141, 148-51, 162-63 (1925); Bourhill v. Young, A.C. 92, 98, 101-02, 104-05, 111, 116-17
(1943); Boardman v. Sanderson, I W.L.R. 1317 (C.A. 1964).
70. See D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). The court here
stressed that whether there exists a duty of care running from the defendant to the plaintiff is a
question for the court and not the jury.
71. A jury verdict does not create precedential law. Blackmer, Negligence Actions for Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium Without Physical Injury, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1142, 1161
(1981).
72. The court's opening sentence implies a duty: "A cause of action may be stated for the
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress .... " 4 Ohio St. 3d at 131, 447 N.E.2d at 109.
73. Liberation will only be complete when the court adopts a system whereby both parties
must present objective, credible evidence of their positions.
74. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112.
75. The court in Rodrigues presented four reasons for limiting recovery to claims of serious
emotional distress. First, minor shock is a consequence of civilized society. Second, social controls
may more adequately deal with infliction of minor distress than legal controls. Third, some types
of shock may be beneficial. Fourth, the law should not reinforce the neurotic patterns of society.
52 Hawaii at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 520.
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did not justify denying recovery for an entire class of claims. Emotional
distress was equated with physical injury, in that the social value of
recovery predominates over the possibility of feigned claims."
Finally, the court considered the judicial economy of its decision.
The court attempted to present a framework under which claims could
be evaluated, 7 and created what it believed to be a workable scheme
for the presentation of proof of emotional distress cases.7 8
Theoretically, then, emotional harmony is a legally guarded interest whose general protection predominates over the danger of false recovery. The court attempted to protect the integrity of the tort system
by imposing the seriousness requirement and the evidentiary standards
to be weighed by the jury.7 Although Schultz holds that a defendant
has a duty to refrain from negligently causing a plaintiff to suffer
mental shock from an unsecured glass sheet smashing through his
windshield, the scope of the duty requirement cannot be gleaned from
the Schultz decision. No hint was given as to the shifting value of the
protected interest of emotional tranquility, as the utility of the defendant's conduct increases or the foreseeability of the harm decreases."'
As litigation in the field increases, the court will have to incorporate into its duty requirement all of the policy considerations mentioned
above to offer guidance to potential litigants. The court will also have
to address the issue of what constitutes deficient conduct breaching
that duty of care.
Prosser holds that conduct which foreseeably places the plaintiff at
risk of suffering serious emotional harm will not support liability: the
defendant's conduct must create an unreasonable risk of resulting in
emotional damage to the plaintiff."1 In determining whether a defendant created such an unreasonable risk, a jury will examine the useful-

76. See 4 Ohio St. 3d at 134, 447 N.E.2d at 111-12.
77. A flood of litigation and administrative unworkability are major arguments in support of
the impact rule. See Note, supra note 47, at 468-69; see also Note, Damages for Fright, 34
HARV. L. REV. 260, 265, 270 (1921).
78. See 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112-13.
79. Justice Holmes followed the trend of dissenters in other jurisdictions which abandoned
the ensuing physical injury requirement by scorning the parameters for recovery as too openended. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 140, 447 N.E.2d at 116; see also Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 935, 616 P.2d at
824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting and labeling parameters "non-standards, opening
wide the door to abuse").
80. The cost-benefit analysis is discussed in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947) (the burden of precautions must be less than the probability of the injury
times its severity to allow efficient economic recovery). See also Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148
(2d Cir. 1949) (Learned Hand discussed the limitations of his formula); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-61 (1972) (discusses the
possibility of placing cost-benefit analysis into private hands).
81. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
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ness and social acceptability of the proscribed conduct versus the risk
of the resulting harm.82 As drivers have always been liable to their fellow motorists for their negligence, 8 Schultz offers little precedential
value for claims outside the motorist sphere.8 '
Thus far, the value of mental tranquility has not been judicially
evaluated against any activity other than one in which liability had previously been established. However, the tone of Schultz suggests that
the true hurdle to recovery lies in convincing a judge that emotional
harm might be reasonably foreseeable so that the case is sent to a jury
for a factual determination. Once a duty is found, a breach will probably be inferred."5
B. Proximate Causation & Proof of Injury
Evidence of proximate cause may be either direct and dramatic, as
a bullet killing an otherwise healthy person, or confounded by preexisting conditions,8 delayed reactions,87 and intervening factors." Although psychiatry can now accurately detect the existence of emotional
distress, 89 medical science cannot yet trace psychic trauma to its exact
causes.90 As a result, medical guidance, even when expressly required,
may be of little actual value to jurors.
The jury must typically resolve the issue of proximate cause by
reference to a sequence of events and often unclear medical testimony. 1 The Schultz majority found that the defendant's negligence
caused the glass sheet to crash into Schultz's vehicle, thereby resulting
in his traumatic neurosis.9 The court relied upon three medical doctors
82. Blackmer, supra note 71, at 1168.
83. Id. at 1163.
84. Ironically, Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983), involved three
negligent motorists in three separate events, so claims other than the automobile variety have not
yet been adjudicated in Ohio.
85. See Blackmer, supra note 71, at 1149; Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 936, 616 P.2d at 825, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 843 (Clark, J., dissenting); see also Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV.
1, 24 (1953).
86. A preexisting condition is, of course, indicated when the plaintiff reacts violently to a
minor stimulus. See Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 121.
87. It has been suggested that proof of causation becomes too obscure in traumatic neurosis
cases when a symptom-free span of a few days separates the focal event and the onset of the
neurosis. Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 126.
88. Traumatic neurosis is greatly aggravated by the stress of approaching litigation. See
Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 125.
89. "Today, the prevailing position of the medical world is that mental injury can be accurately diagnosed." Note, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical
Injury, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 851, 857 (1981).
90. "Causation is obscure enough, at the best, in traumatic neurosis cases .
See
Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 126.
91. See Blackmer, supra note 71, at 1148.
92. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 447 N.E.2d at 112. "Three medical doctors and a doctor of
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and a psychologist to establish proximate cause. 9"
By at least treating the issue of proximate cause in passing, the
Ohio Supreme Court avoided the pitfall of allowing a jury to presume
causality when presented with a negligent defendant and an injured
plaintiff. By not capitalizing on the issue, however, the court missed an
opportunity to set standards which could moderate unwarranted claims
and protect the defendant from draconian liability. Specifically, the
court could have required that at least the majority of the plaintiff's
symptoms appear within a reasonable time after the focal event. 9 ' If
the court perceives the traumatic event as minor in proportion to the
plaintiff's reaction, then the court should require psychiatric examination for signs of preexisting susceptibility to injury.9 The plaintiff's activities prior to trial but after the incident should be examined to ensure that the plaintiff has sought and followed appropriate treatment.
Finally, intervening events, such as the stress accompanying trial preparation, should be considered, as the plaintiff's unrelated activities
often confound causation and are far too remote to be compensable."
As the jurors must ultimately resolve issues of fact by incorporating a
commonsense approach, the court should provide directions on proximate cause theories and the factors discussed above.9 7
The Schultz court's ultimate reliance on the jury's discretion without a requirement of evidence stronger than that required in ordinary
negligence actions may result in proximate cause depending on likelihood, which always seems greater in retrospect. The defendant will find
himself or herself at a strategic disadvantage on the issue of proximate
cause if the court subsequently fails to address the issue, as the tendency is to attach moral blame to a negligent defendant and presume
causality. Such a presumption will result in the defendant bearing an
unreasonably heavy burden, as injury is difficult to refute after the fact.
Care should be taken so as not to attach unwarranted liability to a
merely negligent defendant.9 A passing indiscretion could subject a de-

psychology testified to the effect that appellant suffers from traumatic neurosis, which was directly
caused by the collision." Id.
93. The court deferred to the experts' opinions but evidently saw no purpose in expressly
requiring medical evidence in subsequent cases. " In most instances, expert medical testimony will
Id. (emphasis added).
help establish the validity of the claim .
94.

See supra note 88.

95. A competent psychiatrist can usually identify characteristics of instability by examining
the patient's prior history. See Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 121.
96. A plaintiff who escapes an accident which would not have caused serious injury cannot
recover for anxiety incurred from brooding about what might have happened. Smith & Solomon,
supra note 43, at 126.
97. Blackmer, supra note 71, at 1165. (the author concedes that the court probably must
accept the jury's commonsense judgment on the issue of proximate cause).
98. See Miller, supra note 68, where the author urges a resolution of the emotional distress
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/7
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fendant to financial ruin when a mere touch of a vulnerable plaintiff
becomes an overwhelming liability in court. 99
Of the four elements of an ordinary negligence action, 10 Schultz
focused its main attention on proof of damages. By requiring that the
emotional distress be serious, the court encouraged direct and specific
pleadings.1"' Unfortunately, however, a workable definition of "serious"
emotional distress has not yet been formulated.
In Rodrigues v. State, 02 the Hawaii Supreme Court abrogated
the physical manifestation of fright requirement and limited "serious"
emotional distress to cases in which "a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental distress
engendered by the circumstances of the case."' 03 Likewise, in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospital,os a California court abandoned the physical manifestation of fright requirement' 0 6 and mandated that "serious" distress be "severe and debilitating."' 6 Both cases were cited in
Schultz and were subsequently adopted in Paugh v. Hanks,10 7 decided
three months after Schultz. Once again, the harrowing fact patterns in
Schultz and Paugh'°8 obscure the usefulness of the definitions, as any
theoretical definition of "serious" is overridden by its application to
specific facts. As jurors flesh out the requirements of serious emotional
distress as defined in Paugh, they should consider the plaintiffs continuing treatment requirements, the daily restrictions on his ordinary activities, recurring physical and mental reactions, and finally, the social

issue imposing a duty upon the defendant to avoid subjecting a plaintiff to reasonably foreseeable
distress provided that the dollar amount of his liability be adjusted downward.
99. Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 97.
100. See supra note 63.
101. Blackmer, supra note 71, at 1165.
102. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
103. Id.
104. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d 925, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
105. Reasons for rejection of the ensuing physical injury requirement include that it permits
recovery for trivial physical injury while mechanically denying recovery in potentially valid claims
without physical injury, that it encourages inflated claims, and that the border between physical
and emotional injury is indistinct. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 927-31, 616 P.2d at 819-21, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 837-39, which held that the essential issue is one of adequacy of proof and not fine
distinctions regarding physical injury.
106. Symptoms of serious emotional distress include phobias, traumatic neurosis, psychosis,
and chronic depression. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
107. 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983) (mother allowed to recover for anxiety over
the safety of herself and her family when defendants' cars crashed into her living room).
108. An example of a fact pattern wherein emotional distress was inferred is Wallace, 269
A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (where plaintiff discovered a used prophylactic in a Coca-Cola bottle he was
drinking from). The court affirmed the jury's verdict, stating "[t]he ordinary knowledge acquired
from everyday experience by the jurors justifies [the jurors'] conclusion. No expert medical testimony onby
theeCommons,
point was necessary."
Published
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stigma attached to the plaintiff's disability.1 0' Subsequent decisions will
offer the true parameters of serious emotional distress.
Relying upon the established skill of the judicial system in spotting
meritorious claims and the genuineness of proof standards used in ordi-

nary tort cases, 110 Schultz rejected the physical manifestation of fright
requirement relied upon in other jurisdictions."' Although sound arguments have been advanced against the requirement,11 ' courts which
have rejected it have still generally attached importance to evidence of
physical injury resulting from fright.
While the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the physical manifestation of fright requirement in Rodrigues v. State,1 physical injury
remains a key consideration in proof of injury from serious emotional
distress. 4 The court found that emotional distress can result in either
a primary mental reaction or a secondary mental reaction. 1 5 Secondary reactions are of extended duration, usually include a physical injury, and lend themselves with ease to the judicial process, in that the
causal relationship can be established to a high degree of certainty. 1
Primary reactions, on the other hand, are characterized by grief, shock,
or fear and are instinctual and temporal. Primary reactions often have
no accompanying physical reaction and thus the causal link is more
conjectural. 1 7 The psychological systems are so broad that medical testimony becomes clouded by subjectivity.1 1 8 A prima facie case in favor
of the plaintiff, therefore, largely hinges upon the occurrence and documentation of physical impairment. 11 9
Justice Holmes, the sole dissenter in Schultz, urges that proof of

109. Blackmer, supra note 71, at 1166.
110. Courts abandoning the ensuing physical injury requirement typically express such confidence in the judicial system. "The judicial system and evidentiary requirements have proven to
be safeguards against fictitious claims in other personal injury cases and will function similarly in
emotional distress cases." 4 Ohio St. 3d at 134, 447 N.E.2d at 112; see also 8 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 534, 547 n.80 (1980) (discusses the optimism apparent in progressive jurisdictions).
11. For an extensive survey of jurisdictions requiring physical manifestations of fright, see
Payton, 386 Mass. at -,
437 N.E.2d at 175 n.5.
112. See supra note 106. The underlying rationale for the ensuing physical injury requirement has been that it assures genuineness of claims. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 54
(1965).
113. Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
114. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (ten-year-old plaintiff,
outside the zone of personal danger, recovered for emotional distress not culminating in physical
injury upon witnessing the negligent running down and killing of his step-grandmother).
115. Id. at 411, 520 P.2d at 766. See 50 U. ON. L. REV. 200, 208 (1981).
116. Rodrigues, 55 Hawaii at 412, 520 P.2d at 767. Secondary reactions include headaches,
backaches, nausea, weight loss, traumatic neurosis, nightmares, and loss of sight or hearing.
117. See Note, supra note 115, at 208.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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damages be evidenced by objective symptomatology."2 ° He maintains
that the seriousness requirement must be refined to be of any practical
assistance to a jury.121 Such a scheme may well represent a viable compromise between the physical manifestation requirement and the broad
standards of proof used in ordinary negligence actions. A requirement
of evidence which objectively documents symptoms of emotional distress neither predicates recovery upon an uncertain physical injury nor
overburdens a jury with unlimited discretion. Objective symptomatology will admit claims where physical trauma from fright is present,
while not precluding an entire class of claims .which must rely upon
non-physical evidence as proof of genuineness. In close cases, objective
symptomatology offers a workable scheme of proof whereby neither
party is favored.
The jury must face one final hurdle in the disposition of a Schultz
emotional distress case, which produces difficulties in even the clearest
of tort claims: how an injury, once established, can be translated into a
specific dollar value. Schultz offers no guidelines, other than the jury's
traditional common sense and good faith.
Although the issue of dollars and cents is problematic, it is not
insurmountable. Some cases will yield an easier valuation by the degree
of the defendant's culpability, while others may be influenced by dramatic presentation. In any event, the court may resort to traditional
methods of control, such as the directed verdict and remittitur, when
the jury yields an untenable figure.12
CONCLUSION

As Ohio has long been reluctant to advance emotional distress recovery, ifs propulsion into the forefront of tort theory via the Schultz
decision has startled the legal community. Ohio repudiated both the
impact rule and the ensuing physical injury requirement and tacitly
adopted a broad cause of action previously unrecognized for plaintiffs
suffering serious mental distress.
By focusing its comments upon the deficiencies of the impact rule
and the validity of emotional as well as physical injury, however, the
120. Justice Holmes clouded the issue in his dissent in Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72,
81, 451 N.E.2d 759, 768 (1983), where he indicated that mental stress should culminate in "some
resulting physical injury" to be compensable. He then stated that he adhered to his opinion as it
appeared in Schultz. However, in Schultz, he had stated that "it is my view that for practical
purposes the question should probably not be whether the consequences are physical in nature but
whether they are objectively ascertainable." 4 Ohio St. 2d at 136, 447 N.E.2d at 116. Whether
Justice Holmes prefers the ensuing physical injury approach or the objective symptomatology requirement is therefore unclear.
121. 4 Ohio St. 3d at 139, 447 N.E.2d at 116.
122. Smith & Solomon, supra note 43, at 130.
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Ohio Supreme Court failed to establish proper parameters for recovery.
The Schultz decision rejects traditional justifications for the impact
rule but fails to design a scheme which avoids the evils that the justifications were designed to prevent. Although the court's compassion is
laudable, a failure to control the boundaries of emotional distress recovery may result in a trend every bit as unacceptable as the rejected
impact scheme.
Doris A. Harvey
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